Cisco 4404 - Wireless LAN Controller Spécifications

Cisco Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access System with Integrated Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (wIPS) Security Target Versio

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11 TSP TOE Security Policy Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity WIDS Wireless Intrusion Detection System wIPS

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13 MSE, and syslog server) in the environment for analysis and review, and denial of traffic flo

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15 Figure 1 depicts a sample TOE configuration, highlighting the physical boundary. The shaded p

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17 Cisco Aironet 1131 AG Series Access Point The Cisco Aironet 1131 AG Series IEEE 802.11a/b/g

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19 Cisco Aironet 1520 AG Series Access Point The Cisco Aironet 1520 AG Series IEEE 802.11a/b/g

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21 succeeds before allowing any other mediate security function dealing with authentication or a

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23 Catalyst 6500 Wireless Integrated Service Module (WiSM) and WiSM2 The WiSM and WiSM2 functi

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25 external components such as the time server use for Controller clock updates. The APs, and

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27 The Controller can be configured to require the APs to use the Controller’s internal database

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29 EAP-MD5 Not supported Supported EAP-TLS Supported Not supported EAP-MSCHAPv2 Supported Not su

3 6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ...

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31 3) FCS_BCM_(EXT).1.2 was deleted to bring the ST in conformance with current cryptography po

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33 4 Security Problem Definition This section identifies the following:  Significant assumptio

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35 T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain access to services (either on the TOE or by sending dat

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37 O.CRYPTOGRAPHY_VALIDATED The TOE will use NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptomodules for cryptog

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39 OE.TOE_NO_BYPASS Wireless clients are configured so that information cannot flow between a wi

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41 FIA_USB.1(1) User-subject binding (Administrator) FIA_USB.1(2) User-subject binding (Wireles

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43 FIA_AFL.1(1) The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and t

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45 6.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from ac

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47 functions Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with a key size (modulus) of [2048 bits], RSA D

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49 mechanism for administrators and wireless LAN users. Application note: Local authenticati

5 List of Tables Table 1 Acronyms, Abbreviations & Definitions ...

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51 6.1.31 FMT_MTD.1(3) Management of Authentication Data (User) FMT_MTD.1.1(3) The TSF shall

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53 6.1.43 FTP_ITC_(EXT).1 Extended: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel FTP_ITC_(EXT).1.1 The TOE shall p

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55 Application Note This IPS Data Collection SFR (IPS_SDC) is distinct from the wIPS Analysis SF

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57 FIA_AFL.1(2) The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and t

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59 6.2.11 FIA_UAU_(EXT).5(2) Remote authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU_(EXT).5.1(2) The TOE IT E

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61 ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformanc

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63 administrators who have individually authenticated to an external entity prior to trigging an

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65 For non-volatile memories other than EEPROM and Flash, the zeroization shall be executed by o

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67 • EAP-FAST without client certificate: username and password • EAP-FAST with client c

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69 FMT_MOF.1(3) The Controller administrator is able to configure (enable/disable/define/re-de

7 2. The Controller, hereafter referred to as the Controller or the WLC (or WiSM when distincti

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71 configuration or in the TOEs evaluated configuration and is covered with a tamper evident lab

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73 through the TOE by providing the ability to enable and disable the encryption policy of the T

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75 IPS_SDC_(EXT).1 The AP analyzes wireless network traffic, performing signature matching check

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77 ALC_DEL.1 Cisco documents the delivery procedure for the TOE to include the procedure on how

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79 O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE O.AUDIT_GENERATION O.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATION O.CORRECT_TSF_OPERATION O

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81 satisfies the security functional requirements. In order to ensure the TOE's design is c

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83 P.ACCOUNTABILITY O.AUDIT_GENERATION addresses this policy by providing the administrator with

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85 Table 21 TOE Security Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objectives Mapping O.ADMIN_GUID

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87 Table 22 TOE Security Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objectives Rationale Security O

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89 O.CRYPTOGRAPHY Baseline cryptographic services are provided in the TOE by FIPS PUB 140-2 comp

9 EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol EAP-TLS Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport La

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91 O.RESIDUAL_ INFORMATION FDP_RIP.1(1) is used to ensure the contents of resources are not avai

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93 O.WIPS_FUNCTIONS IPS_SDC_(EXT).1 defines the types of traffic that the AP will be able to col

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95 FIA_UAU.1 No other components FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UID.2 FIA_UAU_(EXT).5(1) No other co

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97 FMT_MTD.1(2) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 This ST is based on the PP which was validated as acceptable

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99 CCDE, CCENT, Cisco Eos, Cisco HealthPresence, the Cisco